


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
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
CONTENTS

February 24, 1975

SOUTH ASIA

Thailand's General Election--
A Preliminary Analysis. 1

Philippines: Participatory
Democracy of a Sort 4



25X1

NORTH ASIA

Japan: Communist-Socialist Dissension. 11

The Democratic
Socialists Change Course. 14

North Korea: Kim Chong-il. 17

ANNEX

North Korea:
Situation and Prospect. A-1

SECRET

SECRET

Thailand's General Election--A
Preliminary Analysis



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Many Thai expected last month's general election to be the final chapter in a long and difficult transition from military to civilian rule. In a sense it was. It did signal the end of 15 months of uninspired caretaker government under Prime Minister Sanya Thanmasak.

The results of the parliamentary election, however, are testimony that the transition is far from complete. Thailand still has no duly constituted government almost a month after the election. A cabinet list put together by Democrat Party leader Seni Pramot has been accepted by the King, but must still win a vote of confidence in the assembly. The failure of any one party to win a clear mandate from its voters, and the ensuing difficulties of trying to put together a coalition government, are the result in large part of the proliferation of political parties. Forty two parties participated in the election and 22 won seats in the 269-member assembly, with none coming even close to the 135 seats needed for a parliamentary majority.

The Democrat Party surprised local and foreign observers by winning the largest number of seats--72--in the new assembly. It is Thailand's oldest political party and was long regarded as the only organized opposition to military rule. It had not been expected to do particularly well in the election, however, because of the large number of competing parties, the defection of several prominent Democrats to rival parties, and a lack of money.

February 24, 1975

-1-

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One of several factors benefiting the Democrats was the sudden and unexpected return to Thailand late in the campaign of former prime minister Thanom. This seemed to galvanize activists in Bangkok and in the provinces who were opposed to a return of the "old system," which Field Marshal Thanom at least symbolically represented. At least one prominent conservative blamed his election defeat on Thanom's untimely arrival, noting that his opponents charged that a conservative victory would mean the return of Thanom and Praphat to Thailand.

At least equally important to the Democrats was their familiarity to the voters. In contrast to the other 41 parties, all newly formed, the Democrats have been campaigning for almost 30 years. Bewildered by the large number of candidates running for each seat--in some cases 10 or more--voters presumably found it easy just to vote a straight Democrat Party ticket. The Democrats also seem to have benefited from the splintering of the wealthy and powerful conservative elite into a handful of separate parties, causing the conservatives to compete against each other.

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February 24, 1975

--2--

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Consequences for the Thai Political Equation

In a larger sense, the Democrat "victory" reflects an erosion of public confidence in the conservative elite as a whole, and the military in particular. It was a poorly kept secret that at least four of the conservative parties enjoyed the active support of army chief Krit Siwara and a handful of his business cronies. Most of these supporters remained in the background for fear that their reputations for corruption would "tarnish" the image of the party they were backing. The fact that the three main parties in this grouping--Thai Nation, Social Justice, and Social Nationalist--failed, despite lavish support from the business community to gain sufficient votes among themselves to form a government, suggests some desire for a change from the generation of older Thai who have ruled the country for most of the past 30 years, and for giving the civilians a chance to rule.

25X1

February 24, 1975

-3-

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Philippines: Participatory
Democracy of a Sort



President Marcos is campaigning for the February 27 referendum on martial law as if it were an old-time presidential election. He is seeking to drum up new popular enthusiasm for himself and his government that will undercut foreign and domestic criticism and serve as a popular mandate for future decisions.

In his recent speeches, Marcos has used a different rationale for martial law than that cited when it was proclaimed in September 1972. Then, he alleged that a Communist conspiracy planned the imminent overthrow of the government. Now, he says martial law is needed to deal with the consequences of the international economic recession and the major Muslim insurrection in the southern Philippines.

The people will vote on two relatively narrow propositions--do they approve of martial law and want it continued, and do they approve proposed administrative changes that would increase presidential authority over local government. The vote will be carefully managed to ensure an overwhelming mandate for Marcos. Most Filipinos will probably vote yes without compulsion, either because they see martial law as a definite improvement on the previous regime or because they believe there is no alternative.

An Uneven Record

Since the last referendum on martial law in July 1973, Marcos has loosened some of the regime's more authoritarian aspects. Government censorship of the media has been relaxed, although most journalists are aware of unwritten restrictions and are demonstrating

February 24, 1975

-4-

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that self-censorship is as stifling as the government variety. Many political prisoners have been released, including several well-known political opponents of Marcos. Snap arrests and harassment of potential critics still occur, however, and Marcos' best-known rival, Senator Benigno Aquino, remains in prison. Marcos has dealt relatively efficiently with immediate economic problems over the past 18 months, such as the oil embargo of 1973, and has made some progress toward resolving long-range issues, such as land reform.

Military and political actions, on the other hand, have been ineffective in settling the Muslim insurrection, which has become more widespread and intense. Members of the Marcos clan have used martial law to enrich themselves financially and to deport themselves in the style of latter-day Asian royalty. Dummy corporations fronting for Marcos' interests, for example, have bought up enterprises formerly owned by his rivals. Moreover, the excesses of Marcos' wife, Imelda, have tarnished the regime's image at home and abroad. Last year, she squandered millions to host the Miss Universe pageant in Manila.

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Clerical Opposition

Outspoken critics of Marcos under his pre-martial law regime have had little success capitalizing on the deficiencies of the current one and have been remarkably quiescent. The only important exception is the Catholic Church, which has gradually emerged as the focus for public opposition to martial law. Several liberal priests have been speaking out against Marcos since 1972, but during the past year they have been joined by increasing numbers of moderates and,

February 24, 1975

-5-

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on one occasion, by conservatives. Public pressure from Philippine bishops provided the impetus for last year's highly publicized release of political prisoners, as well as public promises by Marcos to relax some authoritarian aspects of his government.

Church liberals are publicly attacking the present referendum as a "mockery of democracy." They held a well-attended penitential service in Manila on February 21 to protest the injustice of martial law. While maintaining the church's right to speak out on moral issues, the majority of church leaders still oppose such overt political action and want to avoid direct confrontation with the government. Marcos, acutely aware of the church's potential to arouse popular opposition, is trying to exploit ideological divisions within the council of bishops and to create suspicions between foreign and native clerics.

Future Plans

In addition to their politics-as-theater aspects, Marcos' periodic referenda are designed to create a new political structure by enhancing the status of the village-level citizens' assemblies created under martial law. They not only give Filipinos a sense of participation in government, but allow Marcos to argue that his regime is based on direct consultation with the people, bypassing former, and often corrupt, intermediaries like governors and congressmen. The village assembly meetings also give Marcos a carefully controlled forum for identifying potential sources of popular discontent.

In his campaign speeches, Marcos is stressing the need for a popular mandate that will allow him to make important decisions in the future. The only specific

February 24, 1975

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issue he has raised in this context is the Muslim rebellion in the south, but others probably exist. He could, for example, choose to regard a "popular mandate" as license to deal with the question of political trials for such figures as Aquino.

Marcos has spoken about expanding the armed forces because of the increased fighting with Muslims in the south. A major military buildup would entail added burdens on the Philippine economy, as well as personal sacrifices by many Filipinos. Settling the problem through negotiations would also involve hard decisions for Manila, including a willingness to compromise on Muslim demands for autonomy. Unraveling the diplomatic complications surrounding the Muslim revolt would require Marcos to give up the Philippines' claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah.

President Marcos does not really need any sort of "mandate" to take action on these or other issues, for he has virtually unchallenged authority. He doubtless believes, however, that an overwhelming vote of confidence would be a useful trump card that he could play if he should encounter domestic or foreign criticism for some future decision. [REDACTED]

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February 24, 1975

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Japan: Communist-Socialist Dissension Continues

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In a surprise announcement on February 16, "reformist" Governor Ryokichi Minobe of Tokyo declared that he would not seek election to a third term this coming April.

Minobe's decision seemed at this time to be a tactic designed to force a resolution of a dispute between two of his major supporters--the Socialist and Communist parties. But the dispute has since hardened, and the Communists are maintaining that they will not support Minobe unless it is resolved. Thus, the chances are increasing that Minobe will indeed not run. If so, it is likely that Shintaro Ishihara, a Liberal Democratic Party member running as an independent, will return the governorship of Tokyo to conservative ranks for the first time in eight years.

Communist-Socialist Competition

However it is resolved, Minobe's current predicament is the latest and most dramatic reflection of the growing power struggle between the Socialist and the Communist parties, one which raises serious doubts about the future of the left wing in Japanese politics. The immediate dispute is seemingly trivial, involving procedures relating to the disbursement of welfare funds for the Burakumin, an underprivileged Japanese class that historically has suffered under a variety of discriminatory practices. But the dispute is at the crux of the competition between the two parties for influence within the Burakumin community, which numbers about 400,000 persons in Tokyo and some 3,000,000 nationwide. This competition in turn is only part of the larger political struggle between the two parties, one in which the Communists have made major gains in recent years. Indeed, these

February 24, 1975

-11-

SECRET

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successes have prompted the Communists to be increasingly assertive, the Socialists to be increasingly wary, and the prospects for interparty compromise on a variety of issues increasingly slimmer.

Local Political Effects

As the number of contentious issues between the two parties has grown, local reformist incumbents elected with the support of both parties have come under increasing pressure to favor one or the other--with obviously unfortunate consequences to their respective electoral bases. In Kyoto, the birthplace of the reformist movement, Mayor Ninagawa has increasingly sided with the Communists as their local strength has increased. Last year, the Kyoto Socialist chapter defected from the Ninagawa camp and, in defiance of its national leadership, ran its own mayoral candidate--who came very close to winning. The same pattern appears to be unfolding in Osaka this year. The Socialists there have already voted to withdraw their support of the reformist incumbent because of his alleged favoritism toward the Communists.

In Tokyo, Governor Minobe and his group of private advisers have always been closer to the Socialists. This alignment made political sense as long as the Communist party was clearly the junior partner. Recently, however, the Communists have demonstrated that they are at least the political equals of the Socialists in Tokyo; indeed, they are now stronger in terms of municipal assembly representation. The Communists have apparently decided that the time has come to make a stand in Tokyo--even if it allows the conservatives to regain the governorship.

Minobe's initial victory in Tokyo in 1967 gave the reformist movement a considerable boost, and his political demise could have an equally negative effect. Since the Liberal Democrats would be the only

February 24, 1975

clear winners, however, Minobe's departure might generate pressures on the Communists and Socialists to bury the hatchet, at least temporarily. Even so, it is likely that the Communists will continue to increase their local strength at the expense of the Socialists for some time to come. Thus the frictions already evident will continue, at the very least, to hinder local political cooperation between Japan's two major leftist forces. [REDACTED]

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
February 24, 1975

-13-

The Democratic Socialists Change Course

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At its otherwise routine convention this month, the Democratic Socialist Party adopted a new action policy that allows for a future coalition government with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Previously, the Democratic Socialists had maintained that a three-way coalition with the Japan Socialist Party and the Komeito should assume power once the Liberal Democrats lost their absolute majority in the Diet.



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Despite its small representation in the Diet (20 of 491 seats in the lower house) and persistent questions about its very ability to survive, the

February 24, 1975

party's policy shift has helped it capture the political spotlight. However, the immediate reactions have been largely negative:

--The shift will undoubtedly create problems within Domei, the labor confederation that traditionally has been the Democratic Socialist Party's primary support base. The Domei leadership appears to be going along with the change, but it may prove difficult for some rank-and-file union members to continue to vote for a party that has tilted toward the business-oriented Liberal Democratic Party.

--The shift has also weakened the position of other opposition party members who have been advocating a future DSP-JSP-Komeito coalition that would exclude the Communist party. And it adds another strain to opposition party cooperation in coming local elections.

--Despite the political insurance given their party by the Democratic Socialist switch, many Liberal Democrats have also reacted negatively. They are annoyed by the prediction that they might lose their majority in the Diet, and irritated by the fact that the tiny Democratic Socialist Party has taken the initiative in proposing a potential alliance.

--The press has also cast the Democratic Socialist move in a negative light, raising the question of whether the party will now be able to maintain its identity.

Despite the criticism, the party has clearly moved more decisively than any other Japanese political party in some time. Essentially, the Democratic Socialists are hoping to arrest their party's consistent decline at the polls by establishing it as the opposition party most likely

February 24, 1975

to share power with the Liberal Democratic Party--
and perhaps by attracting campaign funds from
business sources. In return, it has shed any pre-
tense of remaining in adamant opposition to basic
Liberal Democratic policies, something which has
been at least implicitly understood all along.

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February 24, 1975

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North Korea: Kim Chong-il

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Kim Il-song is grooming a son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor.

Interest in Kim Chong-il was sparked about two years ago by reports that he held sensitive posts in the Korean Workers Party (KWP): secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and chairman of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department. Both positions are usually filled by members of the elite Political Committee. It is not known if Kim Chong-il sits on the Political Committee, or if he has any significant government responsibilities.

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Kim Chong-il in the two Central Committee posts as of mid-73, claiming that he had been promoted to them after serving as deputy of the agitprop department.

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February 24, 1975

SECRET

[REDACTED]

Even if Kim Il-song is indeed preparing a son to succeed him, there is no guarantee that the general secretary can dictate either the eventual transfer of power or an easy path in winning immediate political acceptance of Kim Chong-il.

[REDACTED]

If Kim Chong-il truly holds the high posts with which foreign observers credit him, the conspicuous absence of any reference to him in *Nodong Sinmun* and *Minju Choson* (the official party and government newspapers, respectively) suggests further problems.

Kim Il-song consolidated his power by taking the cult of personality to new extremes and by exploiting a sense of nationalism linked to the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement. The transfer of political allegiance to another individual--and at that one whose generation had no part in the fight for liberation--would require painstaking care to win over party cadres and to damp the ambitions of senior aides who might view themselves as Kim Il-song's natural successors. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] if Kim Chong-il is really slated for leadership, it may still be some time before Pyongyang is ready to publicly acknowledge his influence. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

February 24, 1975

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ANNEX

North Korea: Situation and Prospect*



TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. North Korean Objectives
- II. The Current Situation
 - Leadership and Stability
 - The Economy
 - Military Factors
 - Pyongyang/Moscow/Peking
- III. Relations with the South
 - Basic Views
 - Recent Trends
 - The Outlook

**This article was prepared in OCI with the help of several other components of CIA. Its judgments, while generally acceptable within CIA, have not been formally coordinated.*

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I. North Korean Objectives

Kim Il-song's basic goals remain: maximizing North Korean strength and independence, maintaining Communist party control over North Korea, and ultimately extending Communist control over South Korea.

Current North Korean strategy in pursuit of these interrelated goals appears focused on:

- Improving capabilities to implement a broad range of military and paramilitary options against the South;
- Maintaining the overall support of Moscow and Peking, while manipulating their rivalries to North Korea's advantage and avoiding subordination to either;
- Pushing construction of a modern industrial base, including munitions plants;
- Exacerbating political unrest in the South, while keeping open the option of meaningful talks with the Pak government;
- Winning additional Third World support for Pyongyang's cause at the UN and, over the longer term, isolating the Pak government internationally;
- Making diplomatic gains in Western Europe and Japan, to clear the way for more liberal credit arrangements and to establish the principle of a "balanced" Western posture in Korea;
- Attempting to engage the US in direct negotiations on the UN Command and troop withdrawal issues; and
- Securing early and complete withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.

February 24, 1975

SECRET

II. The Current Situation

Leadership and Stability

Kim Il-song's position of leadership appears unassailable. While he relies heavily on a small group of long-time associates--mostly full members of the Political Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP)--there is no indication that alone or in combination these subordinates are capable of challenging his highly personal rule.

Political Committee of the Korean Workers Party

Despite difficulties, it is possible tentatively to rank the 16 full members of the Committee, as well as the 17 candidate members, who are mostly experts in administrative, economic, and foreign policy fields. The full members, in estimated order or rank, are:

- Kim Il-song
- Choe Yong-kon (Kim's crony; old and sickly)
- Kang Yang-uk (Kim's uncle)
- Kim Il (military background, government administrator; reported health problems)
- Choe Hyon (military)
- O Chin-u (military)
- Pak Song-chol (foreign relations expert)
- So Chol (military background; foreign relations expert)
- Kim Tong-kyu (foreign relations expert)
- Kim Chung-nin (intelligence expert)
- Kim Yong-chu (Kim's younger brother)
- Yi Kun-mo (party bureaucrat)
- Yon Hyong-muk (military)
- Yang Hyong-sop (government administrator)
- Han Ik-su (military)

February 24, 1975

A-3

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None of these men, moreover, can be singled out as the logical successor to Kim Il-song [REDACTED]

A year or so ago, it appeared that Kim Il, Kim Il-song's old comrade and the number-four man in the formal party hierarchy, was being groomed for the succession. There are no recent signs, however, that this is the case.

In recent years, perhaps with the succession in mind, Kim Il-song has tried to raise members of his family to political prominence. A younger brother, Kim Yong-chu, now ranks high in party and government. Although earlier he seemed destined for leadership, this is no longer very likely; he is sickly and apparently lacks Kim Il-song's commanding vigor.

Kim Chong-il, reportedly the son of Kim Il-song by an earlier marriage, is another uncertain prospect. Little is known of him. He is believed to be head of the KWP's agitprop apparatus, and he may hold higher party or government posts. But there is nothing in the North Korean media to suggest that Kim Chong-il is exercising leadership, much less that he is being groomed for succession. Nonetheless, he is obviously worth watching.

The North Korean military--always politically important because of its size and the guerrilla roots of Kim Il-song's original clique--probably continues to act as an interest group. Military figures like Defense Minister Choe Hyon and army Chief of Staff O Chin-u are key elements in the top party leadership. In the past, military men have been at the center of a number of policy disagreements--on force postures, strategy toward the South, and levels of military expenditure. There is no indication that such problems are now an acute concern, however, or that there is any present threat in Pyongyang to the primacy of politics over military considerations and of party over army.

February 24, 1975

Nor is there any sign that North Korea is seriously troubled by popular discontent stemming from the relative austerity of life or other factors. We assume, nonetheless, that there are pressures on the leadership to continue to improve general living standards, if only to avoid gross disparities with South Korea.

If Kim died in the near future, the Political Committee could probably manage a transfer of power to a collegium headed perhaps by Premier Kim Il. In the ensuing jockeying for power and position, pressures could develop for major domestic or foreign policy shifts. But the odds are against any accompanying impairment of party or state power.

The Economy

The North Korean economy has regained most of the momentum lost during the 1960s, when it suffered from heavy diversion of resources to military modernization, disruption of aid from the USSR, and unrealistic planning. However, the goals of the current economic plan (1971-76) will probably not be achieved until perhaps 1977.

--Production targets for grain--primarily rice and corn--seem within reach. Domestic food supplies should be adequate, despite increased exports of rice, fish, and poultry to take advantage of high market prices abroad. (Kim Il-song recently claimed that North Korea would have a rice surplus of one million tons in 1975.)

--Recent industrial growth is believed to be some 10-12 percent annually--only a few points shy of announced goals. Emphasis is on electric power capacity, metallurgy, machine-building, cement,

February 24, 1975

A-5

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and textiles, and on the development of the relatively new petroleum refining and petro-chemical industries. Defense industries also continue to expand rapidly.

The USSR has contributed heavily to North Korean industrialization and is now building some 30 industrial projects, including steel, coal, electric power, and nitrogen fertilizer plants. In the past, Moscow has eventually written off the costs of such projects as aid; it will probably do so in connection with current projects at some later date.

The Soviet role as the predominant source of external economic support may be a thing of the past. On the one hand, Kim Il-song has complained privately of Soviet unwillingness to continue economic inputs at past levels, and imports from the Soviet Union have indeed declined steadily over the past four years. At the same time, Kim has worked to reduce economic dependence on the Soviets by turning increasingly to Western Europe and Japan for complete industrial plants and equipment.

North Korean plant orders from non-Communist countries in the 1971-74 period totaled about \$560 million and included facilities for producing cement, petrochemicals, chemical fertilizer, and metals. The proportion of North Korea's total trade accounted for by Communist countries is declining steadily--from 85 percent in 1971 to about 55 percent in 1974. Although the value of machinery and equipment imports from the Soviet Union has remained at an estimated \$100 million annually over the period, there has been a marked decline in the Soviet share of total North Korean imports in this category--79 percent in 1971, 66 percent in 1972, 58 percent in 1973, and possibly somewhat below 50 percent in 1974.

February 24, 1975

A-6

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Whether or not these trends continue will depend heavily on the overall Soviet attitude toward Pyongyang, and on the North's continued ability to secure additional medium-term credits in Western Europe and Japan. (North Korea's ability to pay for imports of capital equipment has always been very limited.) In recent months, Pyongyang has found it difficult to secure such terms, mainly because of failure to meet a good many scheduled repayments during 1974. These financial difficulties reflect a serious balance-of-payments problem; prices of Western capital equipment (and interest rates on the loans) have risen sharply, while prices for such major North Korean exports as lead and zinc have fallen.

Otherwise, North Korea appears to have escaped the direct impact of soaring world price levels and petroleum shortages. Pyongyang has always imported the bulk of its oil from the USSR and China. In recent years, China has become the principal supplier, in part under the terms of an aid agreement; reportedly Kim Il-song is dissatisfied with Soviet performance in this area.

Military Factors

Capabilities. Pyongyang, in the interest of providing itself with a range of options up to and including offensive and defensive war, supports a sizable and developing military force which it maintains in a high state of readiness and training. It is seeking as high a degree of military self-sufficiency as possible and, in its effort to diversify outside sources of supply, has been soliciting Western bids for nonlethal equipment suitable for military communications and transport--i.e., helicopters and transport aircraft. To engage in prolonged major military operations, however, it would require logistic support from its allies, on whom it is still dependent for certain types of sophisticated equipment.

February 24, 1975

A-7

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Intentions. A North Korean invasion of the South is unlikely. Pyongyang is restrained mainly by: fear of triggering a US military response that could include the destruction from the air of North Korean cities and industries; by the unlikelihood that it could rapidly destroy opposing South Korean forces; and by its consequent dependence on assured logistic support from at least one of its two major allies.

February 24, 1975

A-8

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Pyongyang/Moscow/Peking

The North Koreans, although they wish to extract as much support as possible from Moscow and Peking, are determined to minimize their dependence on either. Their aim is to be able to deal with the US, as well as with South Korea, in the manner they regard as most advantageous to their own interests--rather than to permit Korea's fate once again to be decided by outside forces.

The North Korean trend toward closer relations with Peking and coolness toward Moscow, initiated in early 1970, continues. One obvious irritant has been a developing Soviet receptivity over the past two years to informal contacts with South Korea. North Korean diplomatic slights to the Soviets have been more numerous over the past year, and at this point, North Korean - Soviet relations seem barely "correct." North Korean official statements--including some by Kim Il-song--contain thinly veiled criticisms of a broad range of Soviet foreign policies. Similarly, North Korean media largely ignore domestic Soviet developments, while giving good coverage to Chinese economic successes.

Correspondingly, Soviet media largely ignore North Korea and carefully avoid identifying Moscow with most North Korean initiatives--indeed, the Soviet press indirectly excludes the North from the socialist family, almost pushing it into the company of China and Albania. Soviet economic and military aid, as noted earlier, is declining in relative importance while Chinese economic aid, though small, is increasing, as is Chinese military aid, probably provided on a grant basis.

February 24, 1975

A-10

SECRET

Pyongyang probably is not happy with the present state of relations with Moscow. The North Koreans do not want to risk the USSR's opting out of the competition for Pyongyang's favor, nor do they want to become excessively dependent on China, with whom they also have major policy differences. Pyongyang is suspicious of Peking's generally softened attitude toward the US in recent years, and opposed to Peking's open acceptance of a continuing US military presence in Japan.

III. Relations with the South

Basic Views

North Korea's view of the South is still conditioned mainly by a desire to keep open the possibility of a Communist take-over within a finite period--by 1985, for example, rather than the year 2000. In our view, as long as Kim Il-song remains in charge, Pyongyang will be unreconciled to the division of the Korean nation and to the existence of an antagonistic and competing regime in its southern half.

Kim's doctrinal position is that Korea must be united and strong to survive and prosper among the conflicting interests of the Northeast Asian powers. He believes that only a Korean political monolith guided by his precepts can manage the effort on behalf of Korean nationalism.

Thus, Pyongyang views the South through the prism of unification. It seeks the most expeditious way to weaken Southern resistance to a wide range of Northern strategies and isolate the South from its foreign supporters and sympathizers.

Recent Trends

Pyongyang's shift to a conciliatory course early in 1971 was partly defensive, partly a response to perceived opportunities. Most important, the North was concerned that Moscow and Peking, in pursuit of

February 24, 1975

A-11

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detente in Asia, might sacrifice Pyongyang's interests in dealings with the US. At the same time, detente might be exploited to secure US military withdrawal from the South, while a more relaxed posture might also forward North Korea's campaign for international legitimacy.

Pragmatism--recognition of the failure of heightened aggressiveness in 1966-69 to unsettle the South--may also have prompted a Northern shift to new tactics. Additionally, there was a need to play to domestic audiences in both Koreas; the Pak government had already indicated a willingness to open direct talks. Moreover, the large vote cast for opposition leader Kim Tae-chung in the South Korean presidential election in April 1971 may have persuaded the Communists that a conciliatory posture might lead to politically profitable contacts with Southern opposition elements.

During the winter of 1972-73, however, Pyongyang apparently lost interest in reducing tensions with the South and reverted to a harsh posture--without, however, returning to the hostile action of the 1966-69 period. The evidence of change includes: the moribund North-South talks; continuing official and media attacks on the Pak government; refusal to contemplate compromise on the UN Command and US forces issues in the 1974 General Assembly; and the North's assertion of its right to control access to certain South Korean - held islands in the Yellow Sea.

It may be that the shift reflected Pyongyang's belief that its more conciliatory course was unlikely to bring it any additional benefits. Although the soft line had helped North Korea in the international

February 24, 1975

A-12

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arena,* the South remained unyielding in its opposition to proposals for early and extensive North-South political interchange. We do not know how Pyongyang weighs the relative effectiveness of the carrot and the stick in seeking to exploit political dissent in Seoul to its own advantage. But while it must have observed that harsh tactics have invariably played into Pak's hands, making more credible his charges of Communist subversion and "threats from the North," Pyongyang must also have recognized that its earlier, more benign tactics were not winning any great support for unification on North Korean terms.

Externally, the shift toward a harsh posture cost Pyongyang nothing. Moscow and Peking continue to support it in the UN and elsewhere, and it continues to make gains internationally.

Particularly since it found the dialogue with the South unpromising, Pyongyang also has tried to engage the US in direct talks on the future of Korea. The North clearly wants to avoid using Peking as an intermediary, probably fearing insufficient Chinese

**The North has been very successful over the past five years or so in redressing a North-South diplomatic balance that once leaned heavily in Seoul's direction. It has won some support in the Third World by economic and military assistance to Africans and Arabs. Obstacles to diplomatic recognition have also been reduced by Seoul's acceptance of the principle of dual recognition. Now, 73 states have full diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, compared to 93 with Seoul, and the North is gaining steadily. Thirty-nine of these states have diplomatic relations with both Koreas. In November 1974, North Korea was able to secure a tie vote at the UN General Assembly on a critical North-South issue.*

February 24, 1975

A-13

SECRET

SECRET

attention to the issue of US troop withdrawal and insufficient Chinese zeal in keeping open the possibility of North-South unification. Kim Il-song also craves the stature that direct negotiation with the US would confer on his regime, with the corresponding loss of prestige to Seoul.

The Outlook

Under present circumstances, Pyongyang's unwillingness to relax tensions with the South is likely to persist, and the North-South dialogue is unlikely to resume in a meaningful way. North Korea will probably want to contribute to political strains in Seoul, to attempt again to make the case at the UN for ousting US forces from the South, and to forestall any meaningful Soviet or Chinese contact with the Pak government.

Nonetheless, Pyongyang seems willing to keep open its dialogue with the South. The Communists do not want to bear the onus of breaking off these talks, whether on the Red Cross level or in the North-South Coordinating Committee. Moreover, there is always the possibility of change in South Korean official attitudes on such matters as North-South personnel exchanges and political conferences, long-time goals of the Communist side. Finally, the linkage with Seoul permits Pyongyang greater opportunities to defuse tense situations and to talk to South Korean counterparts privately, with fewer complications and greater secrecy than would be possible through third-country intermediaries.

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The present thrust of Pyongyang's policy toward Seoul seems unlikely to change unless circumstances change--in Korea or in the positions of the powers

February 24, 1975

A-14

SECRET

SECRET

on the Korean issue. Restoration of political tranquillity in the South, for example, could remove obstacles in both Korean capitals to more businesslike bilateral dealings, particularly on military security issues. New economic stresses in the North might make Kim Il-song more susceptible to moderating influences from Western Europe and Japan--and from his more affluent ally in Moscow. The North might also feel compelled to move toward a conciliatory posture if it appeared that both Moscow and Peking--for whatever reason--were ready to end diplomatic support for Pyongyang's hard-line positions. Finally, there is the possibility of a favorable Northern response to new and attractive negotiating proposals from the US on the UN Command and military withdrawal issues.

25X1

February 24, 1975

A-15

SECRET

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